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Blood in the Water:
Why the First Step Act of 2018 Fails
Those Sentenced Under the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act
Lauren R. Robertson*
Abstract
For some, the open ocean is prison. The Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (MDLEA) prohibits individuals from
knowingly or intentionally distributing a controlled substance or
possessing it with the intent to distribute. Empowered by the
MDLEA, the United States Coast Guard arrests and detains
foreign nationals hundreds of miles outside of U.S. territorial
waters. After months shackled to Coast Guard ships, these
individuals face the harsh reality of American mandatory
minimum drug sentencing, judged by the kilograms of drugs on
their vessels. But the MDLEA conflates kilograms with
culpability. More often than not, those sentenced are
fishermen-turned-smugglers due to financial desperation or
coercionnot the kingpins the statute aspired to target.
In the First Step Act of 2018, Congress attempted to grant
sentencing reprieve to these defendants by extending the safety
valve provision to the MDLEA. When it works, the safety valve
provision enables judges to sentence below mandatory minimum
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penalties. Unfortunately, the unique qualities of international
drug couriers preclude them from receiving such relief. Until the
legislature and presiding judges recognize this, MDLEA
defendants will continue to receive irrationally long prison
sentences. This Note argues that including the MDLEA as an
offense under the safety valve provision fails to mitigate the
MDLEA’s harsh mandatory minimum sentences.
This Note begins in Part I by discussing the MDLEA’s
history as well as how the Coast Guard arrests these defendants.
It then explains how the statutory mandatory minimum sentence
interacts with the Sentencing Guidelines and highlights the
flaws of this system. Part II addresses the safety valve provision
as well as the previous circuit split regarding its applicability to
the MDLEA. Part III introduces the First Step Act of 2018 and
describes how it resolved that split. Part III then evaluates the
effectiveness of the First Step Act’s change and provides a recent
case example. Finally, Part IV concentrates on how defendants
sentenced under the MDLEA are uniquely incapable of
sentencing reprieve. It explores general improvements for the
safety valve as well as specific changes for the MDLEA. This Note
ultimately argues that Congress must amend the MDLEA’s
sentencing regime.
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INTRODUCTION
“Mi amor, perdoname [My love, I’m sorry]. You won’t believe
this, but I’m in the United States. In prison.”1
Until she received the phone call, the fisherman’s wife
assumed he was dead.2 After their home in Ecuador was
flattened by a 7.8 magnitude earthquake, he left to earn money
to rebuild.3 The fisherman’s wife was used to watching him sail
away.4 But this time he didn’t return.5 She searched for clues to
explain his disappearance. Maybe his small boat had succumbed
1. See Tessie Castillo, The Ecuador Fishermen Snatched Away by US
Drug Warriors, INSIGHT CRIME (Dec. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/G4UB-UZ2J
(quoting Manuel Guerrero on the phone with his wife after she assumed that
he was dead for the past eight months).
2. Id.
3. See id. (reporting that half of the families interviewed had made a
vuelta, or drug-smuggling trip, after the Ecuadorian earthquake left
thousands homeless).
4. See Seth Freed Wessler, The Coast Guard’s ‘Floating Guantánamos’,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/62D3-QKLA (“This time [his
wife] was certain she would receive a call to collect [Jhonny] Arcentales’s
waterlogged body from the docks.”).
5. Id.
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to rough seas.6 Maybe pirates stole his motor and left him
adrift.7 A year later, on a crackling prison phone call, she learns
that he had agreed to transport cocaine to the United States for
the cartel in exchange for $10,000.8
The fisherman had sailed to Colombia to pick up the cocaine
with two other men.9 One man had lost his home in the same
devastating earthquake.10 The other had lost his home in a
flood.11 They were near the coast of Guatemala12 when the
United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) spotted them.13
Panicked, the fishermen tried to throw the cargo overboard, but

6.
See Castillo, supra note 1 (explaining that Manuel Guerrero’s wife
wondered if his “small boat had sunk in the rough seas”).
7. See id. (“Perhaps he had fallen prey to the pirates who prowl the
water stealing boat motors, leaving fishermen stranded miles from shore.”);
see also Wessler, supra note 4 (mentioning that pirates are a threat for South
American fishermen).
8. See Castillo, supra note 1 (“Desperate to find money to rebuild their
home, he had agreed to transport cocaine to the US in his boat. Colombian
drug smugglers had promised him $10,000 for the two-week trip.”).
9. See Joe Parkin Daniels, Colombia Continues to Break Records for
Cocaine Productions, Report Says, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://perma.cc/E3LD-NRTN (“[N]ew figures from the United Nations show
that it continues to break records for producing cocaine.”)
10. See Castillo, supra note 1 (“Shirley’s husband, Emiliano, took a vuelta
after the couple lost their home to the earthquake.”).
11. See id. (“After a flood wiped out Bexy Guerrero Salmiento’s home in
2013, her husband disappeared.”).
12. Arrests within the territorial waters of other nations frequently occur
in the facts of cited cases within this Note. While this Note concentrates on
sentencing under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, the
extraterritorial provision granting the U.S. Coast Guard the ability to
effectuate arrests in the waters of other nations is contentious. Recently, the
Eleventh Circuit held that this provision is unconstitutional. See United States
v. Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 127778 (11th Cir. 2020). This means the
MDLEA should not apply to conduct in foreign waters. Id. But the Eleventh
Circuit has frequently examined and upheld the constitutionality of the
application to conduct that occurred on the high seas, or international waters.
Id. at 1268 n.2; see also United States v. Jama, No. 8:17-cr-128-T-27TGW, 2021
WL 825473, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2021) (distinguishing the holding of
Davila-Mendoza because Jama was on board a vessel in international waters
in the Eastern Pacific Ocean). This Note references arrests in territorial
waters because the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of
this provision. As it stands, many incarcerated MDLEA defendants were
arrested in the territorial waters of other nations.
13. See Castillo, supra note 1.
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their efforts were futile.14 The Coast Guard intercepted and
captured them with ease.15
They were shackled in small cells aboard the Coast Guard’s
ship, but the men assumed they’d be transported home.16 As
their bodies shrank from malnourishment and immobility, so
did their hopes of ever seeing their families again.17 By the time
they arrived in Florida, they had no idea they had been at sea
for five months.18 They had no idea federal prosecutors in
Florida would charge them with attempting to smuggle cocaine
into the United States.19 By the time the fisherman called his
wife, he had been sentenced to fourteen years in U.S. federal
prison.20
One drug-smuggling trip (or vuelta) can earn South and
Central American fishermen over $10,000—a life-changing
amount in places where the per capita income for fishermen
would otherwise be $132 per month.21 Many fishermen refuse to
take vueltas.22 But circumstances beyond their control often
force them to assist the cartels out of desperation.23 Knowing
this, the Coast Guard surveils the coasts of Central and South
America,24 often intercepting fishermen vessels in the territorial
waters of other nations or international waters.25 Once

14. See, e.g., United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1184 (11th Cir.
2016) (“During the pursuit, two men in addition to Rolle stood on the deck of
Rolle’s boat and spent approximately 10 minutes throwing large packages into
the water.”).
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See Wessler, supra note 4.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Castillo, supra note 1 (“In Florida, federal prosecutors charged
Manuel and his co-defendants with attempting to smuggle cocaine into the
United States. They sentenced him to 14 years in prison.”).
20. Id.
21. See id. (“[Earning] $10,000 or $30,000 per trip . . . may enable them
to move their family to a gated-community home in Manta, put kids in private
school, start a business or move to a wealthier region.”).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Wessler, supra note 4 (describing the Coast Guard’s directive to
target “low-level smugglers in international waters”).
25. See id.; see also Castillo, supra note 1 (noting that Guerrero Salmiento
was arrested off the coast of Guatemala).
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captured, these men are held onboard Coast Guard ships for
months at a time without hearing their Miranda rights, without
attorneys, and without the ability to contact their consulate or
families.26 Eventually, they arrive in the United States for trial,
still confounded by their capture and dubious that U.S. officials
had the authority to arrest them at all.27
These arrests are lauded by American news outlets,
congratulating the Coast Guard and emphasizing the volume or
value of narcotics seized.28 But news outlets, and the U.S.
criminal justice system, conflate kilograms with culpability.29
Contrary to popular belief, these drug smugglers are not
hardened criminals, but instead work for the cartels out of
necessity.30 They do not speak English and do not understand

26. See Wessler, supra note 4 (“[I]t is the memory of their surreal
imprisonment at sea that these men say most torments them. . . . [T]hese
detainees paint a grim picture of the conditions of their extended capture on
ships deployed in the extraterritorial war on drugs.”).
27. Id.
28. To understand how the media depicts drug smuggling operations, see
U.S. Coast Guard Units Nail Drug Smugglers in Go-Fast Vessel in Caribbean
Sea, Seize $8.5M in Cocaine, SPACE COAST DAILY (Jan. 30, 2021),
https://perma.cc/KC2P-WU56 (reporting on the operation and drug quantity to
imply the smugglers’ guilt); Sara Muir, On Maiden Voyage, USCGC Stone
Crew Interdict Narcotics in Caribbean, DVIDS (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://perma.cc/NB6Y-4GAA (same); Garfield Hylton, Coast Guard Offloads
More Than 30,000 Pounds of Drugs Worth over $400 Million at Florida Port,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/BY8J-PF93 (same);
Carianne Luter, $408-Million of Cocaine, Marijuana Seized by U.S. Coast
Guard, NEWS4JAX (June 9, 2020, 3:31 PM), https://perma.cc/AVE7-5LN9
(same).
29. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30. See Castillo, supra note 1 (“Many fishermen, knowing the risks of
smuggling, refuse to take vueltas. But catastrophe can push them to
reconsider.”); Colleen Long, Four Jamaican Fisherman Detained on Coast
Guard Ships, AP NEWS (June 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/4GQA-6QMG
(“[F]ishermen were detained for nearly a month aboard U.S. Coast Guard
vessels in the Caribbean Sea, spending much of their time chained to the deck
in the blistering sun while their families believed they were dead.”); Dr. David
Soud et al., Hidden in Plain Sight: Fishing Boats as Links in Illicit Supply
Chains, WINDWARD (July 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/565Z-CDC8 (“If you are
an artisanal fisher in northern Ecuador, struggling to make ends meet on
account of depleting fish stocks, you have a ready alternative.”).
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our criminal justice system.31 Unbeknownst to them, that will
not matter during sentencing.32
The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA)33
grants the Coast Guard the authority to arrest these men.34 It
prohibits an individual from knowingly or intentionally
distributing a controlled substance or possessing it with intent
to distribute,35 even when hundreds of miles outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.36 The
extraterritorial provision remains a point of controversy,
especially because it applies U.S. federal criminal law to
non-citizens with few connections to the country.37 Some
scholars argue that the jurisdictional grant is well within
Congress’s authority.38 Proponents of the jurisdiction claim the
broad grant is necessary for the Coast Guard to operate.39
31. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part I.C.1.
33. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–08.
34. See Aaron J. Casavant, In Defense of the U.S. Maritime Drug
Enforcement Act: A Justification for the Law’s Extraterritorial Reach, 8 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 113, 117 (2017) (“Despite the fact that these crimes take place
thousands of miles from the United States aboard vessels that are registered
in foreign countries and crewed by foreign nationals, these drug traffickers are
often successfully prosecuted in U.S. federal courts, receiving lengthy prison
sentences for violating . . . the [MDLEA].”).
35. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70504(b)(2).
36. § 70504(b)(2).
37. See Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s
Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2009) (“[M]ost or all of the MDLEA’s jurisdictional
provisions go beyond Congress’s Article I powers in several ways.”).
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit limits the MDLEA’s reach by imposing a
“nexus” requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1176
(9th Cir. 2006) (applying the nexus requirement); United States v. Perlaza,
439 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v.
Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1998) (same).
38. See Casavant, supra note 34, at 118.
39. See Justin S. Daniel, Operational Diplomacy: Jurisdiction
Certification and the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 29 IND. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (discussing the Coast Guard’s methods of enforcing
the MDLEA); see, e.g., BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENF’T AFFS., U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: DRUG &
CHEMICAL CONTROL 38 (2020), https://perma.cc/3TFD-CLH6 (PDF) (“[I]n Fiscal
Year 2019, the [Coast Guard] disrupted 236 drug smuggling events, which
included the seizure of 153 vessels, detention of 611 suspected smugglers, and
removal of 207.9 metric tons (MT) of cocaine and 28.7 MT of marijuana.”).
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Though the extraterritorial reach of the MDLEA is outside the
scope of this Note, the bewilderment and horror these fishermen
experience when they learn who regulates their punishment
contributes to this Note’s broader argument.40
Congress justified the MDLEA by declaring that
“trafficking in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious
international problem, is universally condemned, and presents
a specific threat to the security and societal well-being of the
United States.”41 This aligns with the international perspective
for which the United States is largely responsible.42 The United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, written after the MDLEA’s
enactment, provides for international cooperation regarding
measures taken against drug trafficking.43 The Parties to the
Convention emphasized the negative impact of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances on the wellbeing of the countries.44
In conjunction with the MDLEA, this effectively empowered the
United States to become the police of the seas.45
40. See Wessler, supra note 4 (“These fishermen-turned-smugglers are
caught in international waters, or in foreign seas, and often have little or no
understanding of where the drugs aboard their boats are ultimately bound.
Yet nearly all of these boatmen are now carted . . . to the United States.”).
41. 46 U.S.C. § 70501.
42. See David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN
Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 18 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 387, 388 (1990) (“The U.S.
participated actively in the negotiation of the Convention, and many of its
provisions reflect legal approaches and devices already found in U.S. law.”).
43. See UN Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC], United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, U.N. Doc. ST/CND/1/Add.3, at 1 (Dec. 19, 1988) (“Recognizing that
eradication of illicit traffic is a collective responsibility of all States and that,
to that end, [coordinated action] within the framework of international
[cooperation] is necessary.”).
44. See id. (“[D]eeply concerned by the magnitude of and rising trend in
the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in . . . drugs . . . which pose a
serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect
the economic, cultural and political foundations of society . . . .”).
45. See Greg Shelton, The United States Coast Guard’s Law Enforcement
Authority Under 14 U.S.C. § 89: Smugglers’ Blues or Boaters’ Nightmare, 34
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 935 (1993) (“[T]he Coast Guard considers itself the
nation’s premier maritime law enforcement agency. It is firmly committed to
continuing the drug war in the maritime area and, accordingly, drug
interdiction is the most significant Coast Guard mission in terms of effort
dedicated and money spent.” (quotations omitted)).
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The fishermen are caught in a net. These men, from places
like Ecuador and Guatemala, will be judged in American
courts.46 With American shortcomings.47 They will serve time in
American prisons.48 The months spent imprisoned on Coast
Guard ships will only be a fraction of the sentence they will
ultimately serve.49 Meanwhile, their wives and children will
suffer financially and emotionally from their absence.50 Often,
their family members have no idea what became of their loved
ones.51 They will wonder where they are—wonder if they are
still alive.52
In some ways, the MDLEA is like any other drug crime
statute in America.53 The associated punishment is severe;54 the
legislative history is riddled with flaws.55 However, Congress
recently attempted to grant sentencing reprieve to these
46. See Castillo, supra note 1.
47. Cf. Walter I. Gonçlaves, Jr., Banished and Overcriminalized: Critical
Race Perspectives of Illegal Entry and Drug Courier Prosecutions, 10 COLUM.
J. RACE & L. 1, 60 (2020) (“The federal system perpetuates racial imbalances,
even though it incarcerates only twelve percent of prisoners in the United
States. For instance, in 2007, Latinxs constituted forty percent of newly
sentenced offenders in federal prisons and accounted for nearly one in three of
all federal inmates.”).
48. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1).
50. See Castillo, supra note 1 (noting that the women have created a
support group, Organization de Mujeres de Pescadores en el Extranjero, with
over two hundred members).
51. Id. (recounting how Guerrero’s wife frantically searched for clues to
his disappearance for months even though neighbors advised her to move on
because he was surely dead).
52. Id.
53. See War on Drugs, HISTORY (May 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/8JZJHYKH (last updated Dec. 17, 2019) (providing a timeline of the War on Drugs);
Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting: The
Continued Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INST. (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://perma.cc/DX4P-XFLB (“The penalties for violating U.S. drug law
extend beyond prison, and the specter of past drug crimes can haunt
individuals for years.”); German Lopez, The War on Drugs, Explained, VOX
(May 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/GZ5Q-MLRX (“[F]ederal programs that
encourage local and state police departments to crack down on drugs may
create perverse incentives to go after minority communities. Some federal
grants, for instance, previously required police to make more drug arrests in
order to obtain more funding for anti-drug efforts.”).
54. See infra Part I.C.
55. See infra Part I.A.
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fishermen-turned-smugglers. In the First Step Act of 2018,
Congress extended the safety valve provision to the MDLEA,
giving it the protection Congress had given to domestic couriers
in 1994.56 Though the intent may be good, this development
accomplishes little. The unique qualities of international drug
couriers preclude them from receiving relief. Until the
legislature and presiding judges recognize this, MDLEA
defendants will continue to receive irrationally long prison
sentences.57
This Note argues that including the MDLEA as an offense
under the safety valve provision fails to mitigate the MDLEA’s
harsh mandatory minimum sentences.58 This Note begins in
Part I by discussing the MDLEA’s history as well as how the
Coast Guard arrests these defendants. It then explains how the
statutory mandatory minimum sentence interacts with the
Sentencing Guidelines and highlights the flaws of this system.59
Part II addresses the safety valve provision as well as the
Circuit split regarding its applicability to the MDLEA. Part III
introduces the First Step Act of 2018 and describes how it
resolved that split. Part III then evaluates the effectiveness of
the First Step Act’s change and provides a recent case example.
Finally, Part IV concentrates on how defendants sentenced
under the MDLEA are uniquely incapable of sentencing
reprieve. It explores general improvements for the safety valve
as well as specific changes for the MDLEA.60 This Note
ultimately argues that Congress must amend the MDLEA’s
sentencing regime.61
I.

THE MARITIME DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
A.

History

The development of international drug trafficking law
reveals the contextual framework within which Congress

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part I.C.1.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
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enacted the MDLEA.62 Penalties for drug crimes committed in
international waters were historically the same as those
committed domestically.63 In 1914, Congress criminalized
opium possession on the high seas and matched the maximum
penalty to importing opium into the United States.64 Eight years
later, Congress raised the penalty for each offense equally and
simultaneously.65 Congress followed this pattern when it
reduced the maximum penalty for both offenses in 1951.66
This changed in 1970 when Congress overhauled the drug
code with the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)67 to replace
federal drug laws with a single comprehensive statute.68 The
CSA created the prohibition against importing drugs to or

62. See United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 295 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (detailing the historical interaction between international and domestic
drug crime penalties).
63. See id. (explaining that Congress has a nearly unbroken pattern of
setting identical penalties for drug crimes committed in domestic waters and
on the high seas).
64. Compare Pub. L. No. 63-46, § 2, 38 Stat. 275, 276 (1914) (“[A]ny
person [who] shall fraudulently or knowingly import or bring into the United
States, or assist in so doing, any opium contrary to law . . . shall be
fined . . . $5,000 nor less than $50 or by imprisonment for any time not
exceeding two years, or both.”), with id § 4
That any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who
shall . . . conceal on board of or transport on any foreign or domestic
vessel or other water craft . . . destined to or bound from the United
States . . . any smoking opium . . . shall be subject to the penalty in
section two of this Act. (emphasis added).
65. See Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 67-227, § 2(c),
42 Stat. 596, 596 (1922) (“[I]f any person fraudulently or knowingly imports or
brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its
control or jurisdiction, . . . such person shall upon conviction be fined not more
than $5,000 and imprisoned for not more than ten years.”).
66. See Boggs Act, Pub. L. No. 82-255, § 2(c), 65 Stat. 767, 767 (1951)
(“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into
the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction . . . shall be
fined not more than $2,000 and imprisoned not less than two or more than five
years.”).
67. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1007, 84 Stat. 1236, 1288.
68. See LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43749, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 5 (2014) (providing a
reason for passing the CSA).
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exporting drugs from the United States or its customs territory69
via any vessel, aircraft, or vehicle.70 The applicable penalties,
now codified as 21 U.S.C. § 960(b) (“Controlled Substances
Penalties” or “§ 960(b)”), tied sentences to drug type.71 For
example, importing a Schedule I or II narcotic,72 like heroin or
cocaine, warranted a maximum sentence of fifteen years and/or
a $25,000 fine.73 However, the CSA did not extend to
international waters.74 If the government wished to prosecute
violators on the high seas, it would have to prove importation or
conspiracy to import beyond a reasonable doubt.75 According to
the Coast Guard, this evidence was “impossible to obtain.”76 As
a result, the CSA inadvertently decriminalized drug smuggling
on the high seas.77 The Coast Guard was still empowered,
however, to seize and confiscate illegal drugs.78 Displeased with
the inability to prosecute, the Coast Guard pushed for
legislation to facilitate criminal enforcement.79 Significantly,
the proposed bill recommended incorporating the penalty
section of the importation statute.80

69. The term “customs territory of the United States,” as used in the tariff
schedule, includes only the States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
See 21 U.S.C. § 951 (providing that the definition is the same as the one listed
within the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, General Note 2,
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N (2010), https://perma.cc/4VLD-4N36).
70. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, § 1005, 84 Stat. 1236, 128788 (1970) (codified as 21 U.S.C.
§ 955).
71. Id. § 1010 (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 960).
72. Id. § 202 (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 812).
73. Id.
74. See S. REP. NO. 96-855, at 1 (1980) (“[The Controlled Substances Act]
inadvertently contained a section repealing the criminal provision under
which drug smugglers apprehended on the high seas were prosecuted without
creating a new provision to replace it.”).
75. Id. at 1–2.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 1 (“The purpose of this legislation is to facilitate enforcement by
the Coast Guard of laws relating to the importation of illegal drugs and for
other purposes.”).
80. Id. at 4 (“The section also specifies the penalties for a violation by
incorporating sections 1010 and 1012 of the Comprehensive Act. These
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In response, Congress enacted the MDLEA in 1986 during
the explosion of drug legislation commonly known as the War on
Drugs.81 At the same time, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act amended
§ 960 to include mandatory minimum sentences.82 A House
Judiciary Committee report emphasized that the federal
government should be primarily concerned with major
traffickers, the manufacturers or the heads of organizations.83
The Committee relied on prosecutors and Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents to choose quantities they thought
were indicative of a high place in the processing and distribution
chain.84 Operating on this assumption, Congress tied mandatory
minimum sentences to offenses perceived as more egregious due
to higher-magnitude drug weight.85 Members of Congress have
since condemned these decisions, stating that “Congress acted
hastily, without sufficient hearings, and enacted hard line
penalties that targeted low-level drug offenders.”86
Congress copy-and-pasted § 960 to the MDLEA.87 No clear
reason exists to explain why these sections are linked.88
Considering the onslaught of drug legislation that was passed
in 1986, the link likely exists because both passed the same
year. Congress has not condemned the decision to apply § 960 to

sections provide penalties of up to 15 years of imprisonment and a fine of
$25,000 for a first offense . . . .”).
81.
Wadie E. Said, Limitless Discretion in the Wars on Drugs and Terror,
89 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 93, 100 (2018) (“Passed in 1986 during the initial years
of the legislative escalation of the drug war, the law provides the government
with the ability to prosecute even mere drug possession by bestowing U.S.
jurisdiction over anyone detained on [ships meeting the statutory
requirements].”).
82. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-750, 100 Stat. 3207
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
83. H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 11–12 (1986).
84. Id.
85. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b).
86. Mandatory Minimum Reform Act of 2020, H.R. 7194, 116th Cong.
(2020).
87. 46 U.S.C. § 70506.
88. See Special Report to the Congress: Report on Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (1995), https://perma.cc/ZE25-9MDS
[hereinafter Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy] (explaining the
legislative history of cocaine and federal sentencing schemes).
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the MDLEA, even though doing so highlights and intensifies the
deficiencies of the sentencing regime.89
B.

Floating Guantanamos

The United States Coast Guard is the lead federal agency
for drug interdiction on the high seas.90 Because of this, it is
largely responsible for enforcing the MDLEA.91 To do so, the
Coast Guard operates a complex system that extends beyond the
territorial waters of the United States.92 The Coast Guard relies
on counterdrug bilateral agreements to board suspect vessels
and facilitate arrests in the territorial waters of other nations.93
It gathers and analyzes data collected from a variety of sources,
including maritime patrol aircraft, to detect vessels.94 Once
found, the Coast Guard employs a combination of cutters,95
aircraft, boats, and deployable specialized forces to target the
most vulnerable points of a drug smuggler’s transit.96
89.
90.

See infra Part V.
BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENF’T AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: DRUG AND CHEMICAL
CONTROL 33 (Mar. 2021), https://perma.cc/6FAC-H4VM (PDF) [hereinafter
NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT].
91. See Daniel, supra note 39, at 3 (discussing the Coast Guard’s
enforcement of the MDLEA).
92. See NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 90, at 33.
93. See id. (“Working in conjunction with the Department of State and
Department of Justice, the [Coast Guard] has negotiated, concluded, and
maintained over 40 counterdrug bilateral agreements and operational
procedures with partner nations throughout the world, the majority of which
are in the Western Hemisphere.”). Worth noting, the recent Eleventh Circuit
case, United States v. Davila-Mendoza, addressed the 1997 Jamaica Bilateral
Agreement and held it was not enough to support the MDLEA’s jurisdiction
grant. See United States v. Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir.
2020) (“But the MDLEA was enacted long before the Convention against Illicit
Traffic Treaty or the Jamaica Bilateral Agreement; therefore, it was not
enacted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause to effectuate those
international agreements.”).
94. See NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 90, at 33
(explaining how the Coast Guard gathers intelligence).
95. For an explanation and visual of a cutter, see U.S. COAST GUARD, THE
CUTTERS, BOATS, AND AIRCRAFT OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD 130–37 (2016),
https://perma.cc/2JF2-R6S6 (PDF).
96. See NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 90, at 33 (“The
[Coast Guard’s] most capable interdiction platforms include flight
deck-equipped cutters that deploy armed helicopters and pursuit boats, and
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The main result is “go-fast” prosecution.97 This term
describes the small foreign vessels going at fast speeds that the
Coast
Guard
apprehends.98
In
reality,
the
fishermen-turned-smugglers attempt their voyage in either a
“go-fast” or a “go-slow.”99 As stated, a “go-fast” is a small, open
hull power boat.100 A “go-slow,” by contrast, is a fishing boat hull
designed to blend in with other fishing vessels that is much safer
on rough seas.101 Neither option provides protection once spotted
by the Coast Guard.102 This incentivizes the drug cartels to send
as many boats as possible to increase the likelihood of completed
trips.103 As the Coast Guard has intensified its efforts to arrest
smugglers, the cartels have responded by increasing
compensation.104 Desperate to escape poverty and violence, the
fishermen go.105 The heads of the organizations and the
manufacturers, the MDLEA’s purported targets,106 are not
foolish enough to smuggle drugs themselves when impoverished
fishermen are plentiful and expendable.107
Those caught end up in “a prison in the open ocean.”108 They
are detained and shackled to a Coast Guard ship heading for the
United States.109 While sentencing may take place anywhere in

USCG Law Enforcement Detachments embarked on U.S. Navy and allied
ships.”).
97. See United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1120 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“[G]overnment witness testified that the term ‘go-fast’ was used by the Coast
Guard to describe a type of vessel commonly used in smuggling operations.”).
98. Id.
99. See H. I. Sutton, 3 Types of Go-Fast Narco Boats the Coast Guard
Faces, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://perma.cc/9X5W-GX73.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Castillo, supra note 1 (“There is simple economic explanation for
this. With the increased risk of being caught, traffickers will offer more money
to fishermen who attempt a vuelta, and thus more fishermen will go.”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
108. Wessler, supra note 4 (quoting Jhonny Arcentales).
109. See id. (“A cuff clamped onto [Arcentales’s] ankle kept him shackled
to a cable along the deck of the ship but for the occasional trip, guarded by a
sailor, to defecate into a bucket.”).
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the United States, the majority of these men are sentenced in
Florida.110 This makes little geographical sense, as Florida is
further from the Pacific Ocean than western states.111 But the
Ninth Circuit, which courts that portion of the country, limits
the MDLEA’s reach by imposing a “nexus” requirement.112
Analogous to minimum contacts, a nexus requires a showing
that “an attempted transaction is aimed at the United States”
or that “the plan for shipping the drugs was likely to have effects
in the United States.”113 The Eleventh Circuit, on the other
hand, previously did not require the prosecutor to prove that the
defendant was headed towards the United States.114 Thus,
Florida (which sits in the Eleventh Circuit) was an easier
jurisdiction in which to prosecute.115
C.
1.

Sentencing

How § 960 Applies

Those who violate the MDLEA are punished in accordance
with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. § 960).116 As a result, the weight of the
drug possessed or distributed determines the punishment.117

110. See Castillo, supra note 1 (discussing why most foreigners are
prosecuted in Florida).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir.
2006) (applying the nexus requirement); United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d
1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144
F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1998) (same).
113. United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1257).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir.
2016) (“The text of the MDLEA does not require a nexus between the
defendants and the United States; it specifically provides that its prohibitions
on drug trafficking are applicable even though the act is committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” (internal quotations
omitted)); accord United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 812 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“And this Circuit and other circuits have not embellished the Act with the
requirement of a nexus between a defendant’s criminal conduct and the United
States.”).
115. See cases cited supra note 114. But see supra note 12.
116. 46 U.S.C. § 70506.
117. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(A)–(H).
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Penalties also depend on the drug involved.118 Most of the men
sentenced under the MDLEA are caught with cocaine.119 Under
§ 960, five or more kilograms120 of cocaine requires a mandatory
minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum of life in
prison.121 As a comparison, it would require 1,000 kilograms122
of marijuana to warrant the same sentence.123 These weights are
consistently surpassed.124 As news outlets enjoy highlighting,125
defendants are often arrested with hundreds, or thousands, of

118. Id.
119. This is presumed from reading MDLEA cases and making note of the
reoccurring drug type. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
120. Five kilograms is equivalent to eleven pounds.
121. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1).
122. One thousand kilograms is equivalent to 2,205 pounds.
123. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1).
124. See United States v. Amaya, 837 F. App’x 726, 727 (11th Cir. 2020)
(stating the drug quantity was 2,200 kilograms of cocaine); United States v.
Arboleda Velez, 830 F. App’x 300, 301 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The search revealed
427 kilogram bricks of cocaine on the Sixoy I and 384 kilogram bricks of
cocaine on the Posicon.”); United States v. Valencia, 822 F. App’x 942, 943
(11th Cir. 2020) (stating the drug quantity was 2,040 kilograms of cocaine);
United States v. Silva-Ortiz, 820 F. App’x 969, 970 (11th Cir. 2020) (1,194.4
kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Tigua, 963 F.3d 1138, 1140 (11th Cir.
2020) (846 kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Napa Moreira, 810 F. App’x
702, 704 (11th Cir. 2020) (1,852 kilograms of cocaine); Untied States v. Lopez
Toala, 799 F. App’x 804, 805 (11th Cir. 2020) (331 kilograms of cocaine); United
States v. Mero Munoz, 805 F. App’x 797, 798 (11th Cir. 2020) (477 kilograms
of cocaine); United States v. Otero-Pomares, 803 F. App’x 251, 254 (11th Cir.
2020) (640.9 kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Reyes-Garcia, 798 F. App’x
346, 349 (11th Cir. 2019) (930 kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Medina,
793 F. App’x 850, 852 (11th Cir. 2019) (191 kilograms of cocaine).
125. See, e.g., Matt Zarrell, $312 Million of Cocaine Seized From “Go-Fast”
Vessels, Narco Sub, US Coast Guard Says, ABC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2019, 2:58 PM),
https://perma.cc/SK4X-XF5J (“The U.S. Coast Guard has seized over 18,000
pounds of cocaine worth an estimated $312 million in a series of drug busts in
the Eastern Pacific Ocean.”); Jillian Olsen, More Than $411 Million in
Cocaine, Marijuana Offloaded by the Coast Guard in South Florida, WSTP
(Dec. 16, 2020, 10:12 PM), https://perma.cc/3JCB-2Q6Y (“Thousands of pounds
of drugs are off the open waters thanks to a major drug bust by the U.S. Coast
Guard netting more than $411.3 million in cocaine and marijuana.”); US Coast
Guard Seizes More Than $59 Million in Cocaine, WSTP (Oct. 11, 2020, 4:38
PM), https://perma.cc/6YMZ-NFVM (“Working closely with interagency
assets, the crew interdicted and seized approximately 3,500 pounds of cocaine
with an estimated street value of over 59 million dollars, according to a
release.”).
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kilograms of cocaine aboard their “go-fast.”126 Like the
sentencing regime, these news outlets fail to critically assess
who was arrested.127
2.

Sentencing Guidelines

Beyond the assigned statutory penalty, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines) critically impact
MDLEA sentencing, as they do any sentencing decision in the
federal system.128 While the statute sets the available minimum
and maximum penalties, the Guidelines help determine where
within that broad range a defendant should be sentenced.129 The
Guidelines contain a Drug Quantity Table that informs a
sentencing judge of the defendant’s base level offense after
plugging in the drug type and the quantity.130 The base offense
levels have no empirical grounding and, instead, reinforce the
weight-driven scheme of the 1986 Acts.131

126. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
128. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351 (2009) (“[T]he
sentencing court must first calculate the Guidelines range, and then consider
what sentence is appropriate for the individual defendant in light of the stator
sentencing factors.”); see also United States v. Eberhart, 797 F. App’x 463, 468
(11th Cir. 2019) (“Even though the Guidelines are advisory, it is still a
mandatory function of a sentencing court to calculate the applicable
Guidelines range as a benchmark . . . .”).
129. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
130. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
131. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007) (“The
Commission did not use this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines
sentences for drug-trafficking offenses. Instead, it employed the 1986 Act’s
weight-driven scheme.”); United States v. Hubel, 625 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849 (D.
Neb. 2008) (“For policy reasons, and to conform to statutory mandatory
minimum sentences, the Commission did not employ its characteristic
empirical approach when setting the Guidelines range for drug offenses.”);
United States v. Diaz, No.11-CR-00821-2-JG, 2013 WL 322243, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2013) (“[T]he Guidelines ranges for drug trafficking offenses are not
based on empirical data, Commission expertise, or actual culpability of the
defendant . . . .”). But see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt.
background (“[F]urther refinement of drug amounts is essential to provide a
logical sentencing structure for drug offenses. To determine these finer
distinctions, the Commission consulted numerous experts and
practitioners . . . .”).
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Once the judge has determined the offense level,132 the
judge must assess the defendant’s criminal history133 and a
range of other factors set out in the Guidelines, such as “role in
the offense,”134 whether or not the defendant obstructed
justice,135 and whether the defendant has accepted
responsibility for the crime.136 Each factor may raise or lower
the final sentence.137 Offense level and criminal history category
are required to determine the defendant’s sentence per the
Sentencing Table.138 For example, an individual charged with
possession of five kilograms of cocaine has a base offense level
of 30.139 Assuming there are no factors that warrant a downward
or upward departure as well as no criminal history (as is often
the case for MDLEA defendants), the sentencing table suggests
a sentence of 97–121 months.140 But because § 960 imposes a
mandatory minimum, the judge must sentence the defendant to
at least 120 months in prison.141 Even though the Guidelines
sentences are non-empirical for drug offenses, the judge is not

132. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b) (providing a list of
specific offense characteristics that would require increasing the offense level).
133. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A (claiming that past
criminal conduct is indicative of higher culpability while also admitting the
“Commission has made no definitive judgment as to the reliability of the
existing data”).
134. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B (providing adjustments for
an aggravating role, a mitigating role, abuse of position of trust or use of a
special skill, using a minor to commit a crime, and use of body armor in drug
trafficking crimes and crimes of violence).
135. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C (providing adjustments for
obstructing or impeding the administration of justice, reckless endangerment
during flight, commission of offense while on release, and false registration of
domain name).
136. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E (providing a downward
adjustment if the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for the offense).
137. See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text.
138. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(providing the most recent sentencing table).
139. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(a)(3).
140. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A.
141. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1).
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bound by them because the Guidelines are only advisory.142
Nevertheless, the statutory minimum removes all discretion.143
As discussed above, unlike those charged under its domestic
counterpart, MDLEA defendants are typically arrested with
hundreds or thousands of kilograms of narcotics, predominantly
cocaine.144 The Drug Quantity Table assigns a base offense level
of 38 to those arrested with 450 kilograms or more of cocaine.145
Where the defendant has no countable criminal history, the
Sentencing Table recommends incarceration for between 235
and 293 months, or nineteen to twenty-four years.146 The
Guidelines seemingly provide support for the quantity-driven
statutory scheme. But it shouldn’t, because the Guidelines
offense levels are unreliably sourced.147 In practice, they
perpetuate the flaws of mandatory minimum sentencing.148
3.

Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Flaws

Mandatory minimum sentences have not discouraged drug
use,149 nor reduced drug trafficking,150 nor resulted in uniform
sentencing as intended.151 Instead, they have disproportionately
harmed minorities,152 usurped judicial power,153 and unleashed
unquantifiable costs on the families of defendants.154 Congress

142. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
143. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1).
144. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
145. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
146. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A.
147. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
148. See infra Part I.C.3.
149. See Molly M. Gill, Correcting Course: Lessons from the 1970 Repeal of
Mandatory Minimums, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 55, 55 (2008) (assessing
mandatory minimums’ impact after twenty years of existence).
150. Id.
151. Id.; see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32040, FEDERAL
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING STATUTES 6 (2013) (“Driven by concerns
that broad discretion had led to rootless sentencing, unjustifiable in its
leniency in some instances and in its severity in others, legislative bodies
moved to curtail discretionary sentencing on several fronts.”).
152. See Gill, supra note 149, at 55 (highlighting the negative
consequences of statutory minimums).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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linked the ten-year mandatory minimum to drug quantity
thinking that it would apply to “major traffickers,” or
“manufacturers or the heads of organizations.”155 This decision
was made devoid of substantiating evidence.156 As a result, this
reasoning became, perhaps, the greatest cause of disparity
within
federal
sentencing.157
For
these
fishermen-turned-couriers, quantity as a sign of responsibility
in drug operations is nonsensical.158
As previously described, couriers are often motivated by
fear159 or intense poverty.160 Mandatory minimums fail to take
155. See Michael S. Nachmanoff & Amy Baron-Evans, Booker Five Years
Out: Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Department of Justice Charging
Policies Continue to Distort the Federal Sentencing Process, 22 FED. SENT’G
REP. 96, 96 (2009) (defining what a major trafficker is and how Congress
believed mandatory minimums would apply); see also Report on Cocaine and
Federal Sentencing Policy, supra note 88, at 118–21 (1995); H.R. REP. NO.
99-845, at 11–12 (1986).
156. See Nachmanoff & Baron-Evans, supra note 155, at 96 (“This
conclusion was reached hastily, without hearings or any empirical research,
and without foresight that the statute would ultimately be used to prosecute
low-level offenders—that is, street-level dealers and couriers—far more often
than high-level offenders.”).
157. See Eric L. Sevigny, The Tyranny of Quantity: How the Overemphasis
on Drug Quantity in Federal Drug Sentencing Leads to Disparate and
Anomalous Sentencing Outcomes (June 30, 2006) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh), http://perma.cc/YLB5-XP6M (PDF) (discussing the
overemphasis on quantity as a measure of offense seriousness).
158. See Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission’s Drug Guidelines:
Courier Cases Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 63,
64 (1990) (“[C]ouriers often are unaware of the quantity or value of the drugs
they are carrying, or even the type, such as crack rather than cocaine
powder.”); Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration of Mens
Rea in Drug Sentencing, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 121, 121 (1994) (summarizing a
case in which a courier was responsible for the entire contents of the luggage
even though it contained more paraphernalia than the defendant was aware
of).
159. See Adam B. Weber, Note, The Courier Conundrum: The High Costs
of Prosecuting Low-Level Drug Couriers and What We Can Do About Them, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1768–71 (2019) (explaining how fear and poverty drive
recruitment of low-level drug couriers); Kevin Lerman, Couriers, Not
Kingpins: Toward a More Just Federal Sentencing Regime for Defendants Who
Deliver Drugs, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 702–03 (2017) (“The temptation of
short-term financial relief comes at the cost of the extraordinary risk of many
years of imprisonment and death by cartel violence.”).
160. See Castillo, supra note 1 (“Many fishermen, knowing the risks of
smuggling, refuse to take vueltas. But catastrophe can push them to
reconsider. Nearly half of the families [the author] interviewed said their loved
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these motivations into account.161 As such, the mandatory
minimums impede a judge’s ability to impose just sentences and
critically assess the culpability of the defendant before them.162
In fact, by 1995, over one hundred federal senior judges recused
themselves from the trials of low-level drug offenders out of
discomfort with the practice.163 In the words of one of these
judges, “I simply cannot sentence another impoverished person
whose destruction has no discernable effect on the drug
trade.”164 Scholars argue the only way to eradicate
disproportionate sentencing is to remove mandatory minimums
entirely.165 Statutory guidelines cannot appropriately assess an
individual’s culpability.166 They are void of mercy and,
one had made a vuelta in 2016—the year a magnitude 7.8 earthquake leveled
Ecuador’s coast . . . .”).
161. See supra notes 149–158 and accompanying text.
162. See Nachmanoff & Baron-Evans, supra note 155, at 98 (“Mandatory
minimum sentences . . . continue to frustrate the ability of judges to impose
just sentences in a wide variety of cases in which mandatory sentences must
be imposed regardless of the culpability of the defendant or the independent
judgment of the court.”).
163. This is not specific to the MDLEA, but harsh mandatory minimum
sentencing practice more generally. Natasha Bronn, “Unlucky Enough to be
Innocent”: Burden-Shifting and the Fate of the Modern Drug Mule Under the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) Statutory Safety Valve, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 469,
479–80 (2013).
164. See Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the
Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1863
n.108 (1995) (quoting Eric Schlosser, Marijuana and the Law, ATL. MONTHLY,
Sept. 1994, at 94).
165. See Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American
Bar Association Annual Meeting, at 4 (Aug. 9, 2003), https://perma.cc/2U3NLUXU [hereinafter Justice Kennedy Speech] (“I can accept neither the
necessity nor the wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences. In too
many cases, mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust.”); Gill,
supra note 149, at 62 (“Now is the time for Congress to do as the 1970 Congress
did and reform mandatory minimum drug sentences. Reform could be
accomplished in several ways . . . . Congress could excise all mandatory
minimums for drug offenses . . . .”); Mandatory Minimum Repeal, FAMM,
https://perma.cc/537S-T2HU (“One way to reform mandatory minimum
sentences is simply to get rid of them . . . .”); Daniel Israel, Eliminating
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, HUDSON REP. (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://perma.cc/2KUA-7FT6 (“If we are ever going to reverse the harmful
effects of mass incarceration, we must move away from doling out lengthy
sentences for minor offenses . . . .”).
166. See Nachmanoff & Baron-Evans, supra note 155, at 96 (“[M]andatory
minimum sentences neither account for, nor allow judges to account for, role

BLOOD IN THE WATER

1635

consequently, justice.167 Repealing mandatory minimums would
successfully end the presumptive ten-year sentence these
defendants face.168 However, arguing for total eradication is
beyond this Note’s scope because mandatory minimum
sentencing failure affects all recipients of statutorily imposed
minimum sentences.169

in the offense or any other pertinent measure of culpability, such as mens rea,
motive, addiction, or the government’s role in facilitating the crime or
influencing the quantity.”); Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case
for Judgment, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q7ZU-DL5D
(“[Judge] John Coughenour says federal sentencing guidelines are overly
punitive, coldly algorithmic measures that strip the courtroom of nuance.
Without discretion, what’s the judiciary for?”); Mandatory Minimum Repeal,
supra note 165 (“Mandatory minimum sentencing laws require judges to give
all offenders convicted of a certain crime the same punishment—regardless of
whether it fits the crime or the offender or is necessary to keep the public
safe.”).
167. See Justice Kennedy Speech, supra note 165, at 4 (“[M]andatory
minimum sentences are unwise and unjust. . . . One day in prison is longer
than almost any day you and I have had to endure.”); Nachmanoff &
Baron-Evans, supra note 155, at 96 (“Mandatory minimum sentences, in
conjunction with the charging policies of the Department of Justice, continue
to hamstring judges in their ability to impose just and effective sentences in
federal court.”); Shira A. Scheindlin, I Sentenced Criminals to Hundreds More
Years Than I Wanted To. I Had No Choice, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/8KEW-A22Y (“Mandatory minimums were almost always
excessive, and they made me feel unethical, even dirty. . . . While I bore the
title ‘Honorable Judge,’ I felt less than honorable and more like a complicit tool
of an unjust system.”).
168. See Weber, supra note 159, at 1759–60 (discussing the mandatory
minimum penalty associated with 21 U.S.C. § 960 and its link to drug
quantity).
169. See Karl Vick, Bryan Stevenson: We’re Taking the Wrong Approach to
Criminal
Justice
Reform,
TIME (Feb.
20,
2020,
7:32
AM),
https://perma.cc/7CYB-G9KP (last updated Feb. 24, 2020) (“We’ve created a
whole matrix for imprisoning, arresting, condemning and marginalizing
millions of people in this country. We are the most punitive country in the
world. It’s so important to eliminate mandatory sentencing.”); cf. John
Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 377, 385
(2013) (“[M]andatory minimums place the primary sentencing discretion in
the hands of one side of an adversarial process—the prosecution—rather than
in the hands of a dispassionate judge.”).

1636

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1613 (2021)
II.

THE SAFETY VALVE PROVISION
A.

The History of § 3553(f)

Fortunately, the flaws of mandatory minimum sentencing
regimes have not gone unnoticed. The United States Sentencing
Commission conducted a comprehensive analysis that
concluded that mandatory minimums led to instances in which
“offenders who markedly differed in seriousness nonetheless
received similarly severe sentences.”170 In response, the
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice held a hearing to
investigate egregious cases to determine where to ease
penalties.171 The consensus was that the controlled substance
mandatory minimums could be improved with a provision that
protected the least culpable offenders.172 Concerned that
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions could have resulted
in equally severe penalties for both the more- and less-culpable
offenders, Congress enacted the safety valve provision
(18 U.S.C. § 3553) in 1994.173
Congress wrote the “safety valve” as a narrow exemption.174
It specifies which offenses the safety valve applies to.175 And
though it grants judges the discretion to apply it, it does not
mandate application.176 The court may sentence below a
statutory mandatory minimum penalty, if it finds: (1) the
defendant does not have a disqualifying criminal history point
total; (2) the defendant was not violent and did not possess a
firearm or other dangerous weapon; (3) the offense did not result
in death or serious bodily injury; (4) the defendant was not an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the
offense; and (5) the defendant fully disclosed all information and
170. H.R. REP. NO. 103-460 (1994).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41326, FEDERAL MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCES: THE SAFETY VALVE AND SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
EXCEPTIONS 5 (2019) [hereinafter DOYLE, SAFETY VALVE AND SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE].
174. Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug
Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1472
(2000).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
176. Id.
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evidence concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the
same common scheme or plan.177 Unsurprisingly, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission reports that the safety valve provision
fails to fully ameliorate the consequences of drug mandatory
minimum penalties on relatively low-level offenders.178 This is
largely due to the broad interpretation of the supervisor
subsection,179 disqualification due to firearm possession,180 and

177. See id.
(1) the defendant does not have—(A) more than 4 criminal history
points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a
1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B)
a prior 3-point offense, as determined . . . ; and (C) a prior 2-point
offense, as determined . . . ; (2) the defendant did not use violence
or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other
dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
connection with the offense; (3) the offense did not result in death
or serious bodily injury to any person; (4) the defendant was not an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense,
as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not
engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section
408 of the Controlled Substances Act; and (5) not later than the time
of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to
the Government all information and evidence the defendant has
concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course
of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the
defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or
that the Government is already aware of the information shall not
preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has
complied with this requirement.
178. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR DRUG
OFFENSES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2017),
https://perma.cc/69UW-PBSG (PDF) (“[N]either the statutory safety valve
provision at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), nor the substantial assistance provision of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) fully ameliorate the impact of drug mandatory minimum
penalties on relatively low-level offenders.”).
179. See DOYLE, SAFETY VALVE AND SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note
173, at 7 (“The term supervisor is construed broadly and encompasses anyone
who exercises control or authority of another during the commission of the
offense.”); United States v. Gamboa, 701 F.3d 265, 267 (8th Cir. 2012) (“It is
only necessary that the defendant supervise or manage one other participant.”
(citing United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 2010))).
180. See DOYLE, SAFETY VALVE AND SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note
173, at 6 (“In many instances, possession of a firearm in a location where drugs
are stored or transported, or where transactions occur, will be enough to
support an inference of possession in connection with the drug offense of
conviction.”).
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the full disclosure requirement.181 These interpretations often
preclude lesser sentences for those who are, in reality, low-level
offenders.182 Thus, the safety valve is capable of ameliorating
harsh mandatory sentences.183 But the current restrictive use
impedes its full potential.184
1.

Whether the Safety Valve Applies to the MDLEA

Congress chose to specify which offenses the safety valve
provision applied to.185 The original version applied to five
offenses,186 but the MDLEA was not one of them.187 The
Controlled Substances Penalties (§ 960), however, were.188 Even
though these sections were linked, the majority of courts refused
to extend safety valve relief to the MDLEA because of
terminology differences.189 The safety valve extends to
offenses.190 Section 960 is one of those offenses.191 However, the

181. See id. at 8 (“The defendant must provide the government with all the
relevant information in his possession.”).
182. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
185. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, § 80001(a), 108 Stat. 1786, 1985
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an offense
under section 401, 404, or 406 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C 841, 844, 846) or section 1010 or 1013 of the Controlled
Substances Important and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 961, 963), the
court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated
by the United States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of
title 28 without regard to any statutory minimum
sentence . . . . (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Compare United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas, 508 F.3d 491, 506 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that defendants were not eligible for safety valve relief),
and United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2012)
(same), with United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 296 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (holding that defendants were eligible for relief from mandatory
minimum ten-year sentences).
190. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (emphasizing the word
offense within the statute).
191. See supra note 185.
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MDLEA refers to § 960 as a penalty.192 The following cases
explain how the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits used this
difference to foreclose safety valve relief.193 In direct opposition,
the D.C. Circuit applied the safety valve.194
2.

The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas

In United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas,195 the defendants
were arrested approximately 480 nautical miles south of
Guatemala with 1,303 kilograms of cocaine on their “go-fast”
vessel.196 After considering the safety valve provision, the
district court decided it applied and imposed a forty-one month
sentence—well below the mandatory minimum of ten years—on
each defendant.197 A panel of the Ninth Circuit disagreed.198 It
stated that the safety valve provision only applies to statutes
specifically enumerated within the text.199 Although the
MDLEA invoked § 960, it did not invoke the full text.200 While
§ 960 was incorporated as an offense to the safety valve
provision, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it serves only as a
penalty provision for the MDLEA.201 If the safety valve was
intended to apply to the MDLEA, the safety valve would have
been discussed within the MDLEA’s penalty provision.202 Thus,
the safety valve unambiguously did not apply to the MDLEA
because there was no mention of the safety valve anywhere in
the Controlled Substances Penalties.203 Even though the district
court had deemed these individuals to be low-level offenders, the

192. 46 U.S.C. § 70506.
193. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
194. See infra Part II.B.3.
195. 508 F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 2007).
196. Id. at 494.
197. Id. at 495.
198. See id. at 506 (“We vacate the sentences of appellees
Gamboa-Cardenas, Cuero-Aragon and Barahona-Estupinan, and we remand
to the district court for resentencing without the safety valve.” (emphasis
added)).
199. Id. at 498.
200. Id. at 499.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. (“These is no mention of the safety valve anywhere in § 960.”).
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Ninth Circuit decided, as a matter of law, to add seventy-nine
months (or over six years) to the defendants’ sentences.204
Circuit Judge Fisher pointed out the flaw in this reasoning
in his dissent.205 He acknowledged the majority’s reasoning was
one possibility, but found that the safety valve was, in fact,
ambiguous.206 The MDLEA derived its punishment from the
Controlled Substances Penalties207 and Congress drafted the
safety valve provision to apply to the Controlled Substances
Penalties.208 Accordingly, one could understand the combination
of these provisions to mean that the safety valve provision
applied to the MDLEA.209
3.

The Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz

In United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz,210 the court considered a
crew member aboard a Colombian fishing vessel carrying “70
kilogram packages” of cocaine.211 The court acknowledged that
if not for the ten-year mandatory minimum, the Guidelines
sentence was nine to eleven years.212 The Eleventh Circuit relied
on plain-text interpretation and, like the Ninth Circuit, declared
that the safety valve statute was unambiguous.213 It used the
204. See id. at 506 (holding that the safety valve did not apply, inevitably
resulting in the application of the mandatory minimum).
205. United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas, 508 F.3d 491, 506–07 (9th Cir.
2007) (Fisher, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
The majority’s reading of the relevant statute is plausible, but it is
not the only plausible reading and this demonstrates the statutory
language is ambiguous. [MDLEA] required “punish[ment] in
accordance with the penalties set forth in section . . . 960.” Since
1994, all penalties set forth in § 960 are subject to safety valve
relief. One could understand the combination of these provisions to
mean that [MDLEA] offenses should be penalized the same as
offenses under § 960, which is expressly listed in the safety valve
statute, and thus the safety valve applies to [MDLEA] penalties.
206. Id. at 507.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 679 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2012).
211. See United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz, No. 8:10-cr-303-T-23MAP, 2013
WL 12213840, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2013) (describing the facts of the case).
212. See Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d at 1328.
213. Id. (“The plain text of a statute controls. The Supreme Court has
instructed that ‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what
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Ninth Circuit’s logic to strengthen its conclusion that the safety
valve’s selection of five statutes reflected an intent to exclude
other statutes,214 including the MDLEA.215 Because the safety
valve refers to an “offense under” § 960, not an “offense
penalized under” nor a “sentence under” § 960, the MDLEA was
not covered by its reach.216 With this, the court quickly discarded
the argument discussing the statutory combination in favor of
the so-called unambiguous text.217 The court affirmed the
defendant’s ten-year minimum mandatory sentence.218
4.

The D.C. Circuit: United States v. Mosquera-Murillo

In 2018, the D.C. Circuit rejected this analysis.219 In United
States v. Mosquera-Murillo,220 the Coast Guard arrested the
defendants seventy nautical miles off the coast of Panama.221
Though the crew attempted to dump the cargo, they were caught
with more than 220 kilograms of cocaine and more than 120
kilograms of marijuana.222 The district court held that they were

it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992))).
214. See id. at 1328 (citing United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas, 508 F.3d
491, 496–98 (9th Cir. 2007)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1329 (“The safety valve statute, section 3353(f), refers to an
‘offense under’ section 960—not to an ‘offense penalized under’ section 960 and
not to a ‘sentence under’ section 960.”).
217. See id. (“[S]ection 960 does not incorporate section 70503 by reference
as an ‘offense under’ section 960. Therefore, the plain text of the statutes shows
that convictions under Title 46 of the U.S. Code . . . entitle a defendant to no
safety-valve relief.”).
218. See id. at 1327–29 (“The District Court sentenced Defendant to
concurrent imprisonment terms of 120 months . . . . We affirm Defendant’s
sentence.”).
219. See United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 295 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (“Two other circuits have considered whether MDLEA offenses
penalized under § 960(b) qualify as ‘offenses under’ § 960 for purposes of the
safety-valve provision. Both courts have concluded that such offenses do not
qualify. We respectfully reach the opposite conclusion.” (citing United States
v. Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2012)); United States v.
Gamboa-Cardenas, 508 F.3d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 2007))).
220. 902 F.3d 285 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
221. Id. at 287.
222. Id.
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ineligible for safety valve relief.223 The D.C. Circuit disagreed.224
The court emphasized that one of the enumerated provisions
within the safety valve provision is § 960.225 The MDLEA states
that this section supplies the penalties for a first-time
offender.226 Accordingly, the defendant’s violation of the
MDLEA also violated § 960.227 Specifically, the MDLEA supplies
the elements that make the conduct unlawful,228 but § 960
supplies the offense elements of drug-type and drug-quantity.229
Both the government’s indictment and plea agreements
supported this conclusion by describing the defendants as
having violated § 960.230 The government still argued they were
not convicted of “an offense under” § 960 by claiming only one
subsection of the statute applied, not its entirety.231 The court
was not persuaded.232
The court stressed that granting safety valve relief aligned
with Congress’s pattern of setting identical penalties for drug
crimes committed in domestic waters and the high seas.233 After
highlighting that history, the D.C. Circuit refused to believe
Congress would have broken its 100-year pattern of penalty
parity.234 Acknowledging that the decision was in direct

223. Id. at 292.
224. Id. at 295–96.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 293 (“[E]ven if the precise meaning of the phrase, ‘an offense
under provision X’ could be subject to some debate at the margins, there is no
doubt: a defendant’s case involves ‘an offense under’ provision X if the
defendant has been convicted of violating provision X.”).
228. Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b) (providing that
conspiring to intentionally or knowingly distribute or possess with intent to
distribute a controlled substance while on board a vessel is prohibited).
229. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d at 293 (“As further confirmation that
§ 960 supplies elements of the defendants’ offense, the government’s
indictment charged the defendants with violating both the MDLEA and § 960,
not just the former.”).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 294 (“The government’s reading of the safety-valve provision is
unpersuasive. The statute speaks in terms of an offense under § 960 without
limitation—not an offense under only § 960(a).”).
233. Id. at 295.
234. Id.
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opposition to the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits,235 the court
vacated the defendants’ sentences and remanded for sentencing,
requiring consideration of the safety valve requirements.236
B.

Petition for Certiorari: United States v. Castillo

In United States v. Castillo,237 the defendant was arrested
105 nautical miles off the coast of Guatemala as he, and four
others, attempted to jettison cocaine bales off the vessel.238 After
being held by the government for twenty days, the defendant
was charged with drug-trafficking crimes under the MDLEA in
Florida.239 The district court sentenced him to 132 months in
prison after ruling that relief from the statutory mandatory
minimum under the safety valve was not available.240 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply the safety valve.241
The United State Supreme Court could have resolved the
circuit split by granting certiorari in Castillo.242 Castillo noted
the Circuit split in his petition for a writ of certiorari.243 But
almost three months later, Congress enacted the First Step Act
(discussed below) and resolved the split.244 Nonetheless, the
petitioner argued that a Supreme Court decision would still
affect a substantial number of cases, including those pending in
any federal district court, any other circuit, and, of course, those
in the Eleventh Circuit that had not been briefed.245 In the

235. Id. at 296 (“Neither of those decisions expressly assesses whether the
drug-type and drug-quantity facts supplied by § 960(b) constitute offense
elements, such that an MDLEA offender penalized under § 960(b) should be
considered someone who has violated both the MDLEA and § 960.”).
236. Id.
237. 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018).
238. Id. at 1211.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1212–14.
242. United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 796 (2019).
243. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed, No. 18-374, 2018 WL 4564803, at
*10–14 (Sept. 21, 2018).
244. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT
OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2019) (mentioning the date of enactment).
245. Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief, filed, No. 18-374, 2018 WL 7051883,
at *3 (Dec. 28, 2018).
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Eleventh Circuit alone, it would impact nine cases recently
decided or awaiting decision.246 Unlike a Supreme Court
decision, new legislation does not explicitly reject the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits reasoning.247 The precedent of using pedantic
arguments to deny sentencing relief remains. And the
philosophy bleeds into all other MDLEA cases.248
III. THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018
A.

Tentative Steps Towards Criminal Justice Reform

The First Step Act of 2018 was a bipartisan approach to
criminal justice reform.249 As the Act’s name suggests, it is only
a tentative step towards substantial sentencing reform.250 The
ultimate goal was to reduce the prison population while still
protecting public safety.251 To do so, the Act is broken down into
three components. The first component requires the DOJ to
develop risk and needs assessment systems at the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP).252 The second component implements several
changes to federal sentencing law.253 The third component
reauthorizes many of the grant programs within the Second
Chance Act of 2007.254
While all three components effectuate needed change, the
second part of the First Step Act is the most important for the
246. United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019); United States
v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Guerro,
789 F. App’x 742 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. Quijije-Napa, 776 F. App’x
583 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. Mastarreno, 748 F. App’x 291 (11th Cir.
2019); United States v. Vargas, 781 F. App’x 815 (11th Cir. 2019); United
States v. Diaz, 745 F. App’x 148 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Jimenez,
756 F. App’x 933 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Torres, 742 F. App’x 493
(11th Cir. 2018).
247. See infra Part III.A.
248. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
249. JAMES, supra note 244, at 1.
250. See Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Consensus, Compassion, and
Compromise? The First Step Act and Aging Out of Crime, 32 FED. SENT’G REP.
70, 70 (2019) (“[The First Step Act of 2018] is, in practice, simply one meager
stride in a required marathon to effect true change.”).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1–8 (listing the requirements of the assessment system).
253. Id. at 8–9
254. Id. at 9.
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purposes of this Note. The changes to federal sentencing law
include mandatory minimum sentence reduction,255 elimination
of the stacking provision,256 retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010,257 and expansion of the safety valve.258 Among the
changes to the safety valve, the Act included the MDLEA in the
provision’s list of applicable offenses.259
B.

Appending the MDLEA to the Safety Valve

As stated, Congress resolved the safety valve circuit split
via the First Step Act, removing the need for action by the
Supreme Court.260 Now, the safety valve provision explicitly
lists the MDLEA as an offense protected by the safety valve
provision.261 Though it resolved frustration over the semantics
of “offense” versus “penalty,”262 it doesn’t do much else for

255. See id. at 8–9 (“The act reduces the 20-year mandatory minimum
(applicable where the offender has one prior qualifying conviction) to a 15-year
mandatory minimum and reduces the life sentence mandatory minimum
(applicable where the offender has two or more prior qualifying convictions) to
a 25-year mandatory minimum.”).
256. See id. at 9 (“The act eliminates stacking by providing that the
25-year mandatory minimum for a second or subsequent conviction for use of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime or a violent crime applies
only where the offender has a prior [final] conviction for use of a firearm.”).
257. See id. (“[T]he Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . increased the threshold
quantities of crack cocaine sufficient to trigger mandatory minimum
sentences. The retroactive application . . . is not automatic.”).
258. See id. (“The act makes drug offenders with minimal criminal records
eligible for the safety valve provision, which previously applied only to
offenders with virtually spotless criminal records.”).
259. Id.
260. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402(a)(1)(A)(ii), 132
Stat. 5194, 5221 (adding 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503, 70506 to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)).
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 3353(f) (“[I]n the case of an offense under . . . section
70503 or 70506 of title 46, the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to
guidelines
promulgated
by
the
United
States
Sentencing
Commission . . . without regard to any statutory minimum sentence . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
262. Compare United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2012) (“The safety valve statute . . . refers to an ‘offense under’
section 960—not to an ‘offense penalized under’ section 960 and not to a
‘sentence under’ section 960.”), with United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902
F.3d 285, 293 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven if the precise meaning of the phrase,
‘an offense under provision X’ could be subject to some debate at the margins,
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MDLEA defendants. To begin broadly, the First Step Act does
not apply the safety valve retroactively.263 This means those
previously convicted under the MDLEA will continue to age in
prison.264 Future defendants are not much better off because, as
previously discussed,265 the safety valve provision is a narrow
exception.266 By including § 70503 within the safety valve
provision, the First Step Act merely applied the safety valve’s
overly restrictive precedent.267

there is no doubt: a defendant’s case involves ‘an offense under’ provision X if
the defendant has been convicted of violating provision X.”).
263. See Keith Wattley, Trump’s Criminal Justice Reform Is a Step in the
Wrong Direction, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/D7C9-MP5Y
But any would-be reform effort that begins by denying the benefits
of therapeutic, educational and vocational programs to the people
who could benefit most is not a “first step”—it’s a step in the wrong
direction. For example, it will reduce mandatory minimum
sentences . . . however, this part is not retroactive, so no one
currently serving such a sentence will have it shortened.
264. See United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 604 (11th Cir.
2020) (“They concede . . . that they are not eligible for safety-valve relief
because, at the time of their MDLEA convictions under Title 46, no Title 46
offense was covered by the safety valve in § 3553(f) or § 5C1.2.” (citations
omitted)); United States v. Quijije-Napa, 776 F. App’x 583, 585 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“Congress made the amendment applicable to convictions entered only on and
after the date of enactment, however, which means that Quijije-Napa may not
benefit from the amendment.”); United States v. Vargas, 781 F. App’x 815, 821
(11th Cir. 2019) (“While Vargas’s appeal was pending, Congress added
MDLEA offenses to the safety valve statute. However, Congress made the
amendment applicable to convictions entered only on and after the date of
enactment, which means that Vargas may not benefit from the amendment.”
(citations omitted)).
265. See supra Part II.
266. See Weber, supra note 159, at 1787 (“Although the safety valve also
functions to spare low-level drug offenders from harsh mandatory minimum
sentences, it has a number of flaws that an amendment of the importation
statute could address.” (footnote omitted)); Safety Valves, FAMM,
https://perma.cc/86NZ-2F75 (“But it is a very narrow exception: in FY 2015,
only 13 percent of all drug offenders qualified for the exception.”).
267. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: ONE YEAR OF
IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2020) (“Most drug trafficking offenders who received
safety-valve relief in First Step Year One (80.8%; n=5,758) were ‘already
eligible’ for relief under the old safety valve criteria.”); Julie Samuels et al.,
Next Steps in Federal Corrections Reform: Implementing and Building on the
First Step Act, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 92, 96 (2019) (“[M]any [provisions] do not
go as far as the [Colson] Task Force and some recommendations are not
addressed at all . . . .”).
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The recent United States v. Valoy268 decision demonstrates
the impact of this precedent.269 The Coast Guard intercepted
and apprehended the defendant and two others as they
attempted to transport cocaine from Colombia to Costa Rica.270
Following his arrest, the defendant provided conflicting
information regarding his compensation.271 Though his attorney
argued that he merited both a minor-role reduction and safety
valve relief, the district court sentenced him to the 120-month
mandatory minimum because of the volume of cocaine on the
“go-fast” vessel.272 The court recognized that prior to the First
Step Act defendants convicted under the MDLEA were not
eligible for safety valve relief. 273 Here, safety valve analysis was
warranted because the defendant’s conviction followed the Act’s
enactment.274 Both parties agreed that the defendant satisfied
the first four factors.275 Only the fifth factor—truthfully
providing the Government with all information and evidence
the defendant has concerning the offense—was at issue.276
The court acknowledged that a defendant who previously
lied or withheld information from the government was not
automatically disqualified from safety valve relief.277 However,
the district court found that the defendant “had not truthfully
provided to the government all the information that he
possessed concerning the offense” because of his prior
inconsistent statements combined with his failure to identify

268. 830 F. App’x 601 (11th Cir. 2020).
269. See id. at 605 (finding that the district court was correct to deny the
defendant’s request for safety valve relief).
270. Id. at 603.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 604 n.1 (explaining why the court assessed Valoy’s eligibility
for safety valve relief).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 604.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 605 (“[A] defendant who previously lied or withheld
information from the government is not automatically disqualified from
safety-valve relief as long as the defendant makes a complete and truthful
proffer not later than the commencement of the sentencing hearing.” (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Brownlee, 204 F.3d 1302,
130405 (11th Cir. 2000))).
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who hired him.278 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that this
precluded the defendant from safety valve relief.279 In other
words, both courts held that providing unsatisfactory
information to the government justifies a decade-long prison
sentence.280 This creates a formidable challenge for a fisherman
that has no worthwhile intelligence to provide, precisely because
of his low status.281
IV. THROW THEM A LIFELINE
A.

Improve the Safety Valve Provision

Currently, the safety valve’s ultimate goal to safeguard less
culpable offenders has not been realized.282 Improving the safety
valve provision could eventually safeguard these individuals
from decade-long prison sentences.283 One way of doing this
would be to eliminate the five-factor assessment that the safety
valve provision contains or make it discretionary.284 This would
give courts the discretion to look at an individual holistically.285
The judge could review relevant facts and circumstances of the
case as well as consider the purposes of punishment.286 Scholars

278. Id.
279. United States v. Valoy, 830 F. App’x 601, 605 (11th Cir. 2020).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 604–05 (providing safety valve analysis without considering
statutory intent).
282. See Froyd, supra note 174, at 1500 (“The current safety valve
provision fails to produce these sorts of equitable sentences.”).
283.
See id. (“Congress could easily remedy the problem of disparity in
sentencing between high-level and low-level offenders by amending the safety
valve provision . . . .”); Safety Valves, supra note 266 (“The Solution: Create a
broader safety valve that applies to all mandatory minimum sentences, and
expand the existing drug safety valve to cover more low-level offenders.”); Gill,
supra note 149, at 62 (“Congress could maintain the current mandatory
minimum sentences, but provide courts an opportunity to opt out of them in
certain cases by expanding the existing statutory safety valve.”).
284. Gill, supra note 149, at 63 (“Congress could expand the safety valve
by permitting courts to invoke it when, after looking at all the relevant facts
and circumstances of the case and considering the purposes of punishment,
imposing the mandatory minimum sentence would violate the parsimony
mandate in [the safety valve provision].”).
285. Id.
286. Id.
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have proposed alternative safety valve considerations,287 which
more aptly depict a low-level participant in a drug trafficking
enterprise.288 Others have argued to standardize interpretation
regarding application of the burden of proof.289 However, these
versions inherently have limitations.290 The desire to broaden
the safety valve is a result of its limited applicability in
deserving cases.291 While broadening the safety valve provision
may increase the number of those receiving reduced sentences
generally, this will not be realized by MDLEA defendants

287. See Froyd, supra note 174, at 1501
The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors a court may
consider when determining whether a defendant is a low-level
participant: (1) The Defendant received a small, flat fee payment
for a drug delivery (rather than a percentage of the profits after the
drugs were sold); (2) The Defendant only delivered drugs one way,
and did not deliver the money in return; (3) The Defendant received
a pre-packaged bag; (4) The Defendant delivered to an individual
not previously known to the Defendant; (5) The Defendant did not
sell or negotiate the terms of the sale of the drugs; (6) The
Defendant had no ownership of any portion of the drugs; (7) The
Defendant did not finance any aspect of the criminal activity; (8)
The Defendant lacked knowledge as to the type, quantity, or value
of the drugs the Defendant was carrying; (9) The Defendant lacked
knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the
conspiracy; (10) The Defendant lacked knowledge regarding the
activities of others involved in the conspiracy; (11) The Defendant
did not supervise others; or (12) The Defendant was closely
supervised by the supplier or distributor.
288. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT OF THE DRUGS/ROLE/HARMONIZATION
WORKING GROUP 62 (1992) (including a non-exhaustive list of characteristics
that ordinarily are associated with a minor role); Young, supra note 158, at 63
(listing other characteristics to consider when measuring a drug defendant’s
culpability).
289. See Bronn, supra note 163, at 496 (“Using the allocation adopted by
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits will achieve greater sentencing fairness and also
correct a misunderstanding of a number of circuits that the safety valve is not
a departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but is rather an excusal
from them . . . .”).
290. See Froyd, supra note 174, at 1505–06 (discussing potential criticism
of the proposed safety valve); Bronn, supra note 163, at 504 (“Some may argue
that the burden of proof to the government in safety-valve hearings when the
government challenges the credibility of the defendant’s disclosure will
undermine the integrity of the safety-valve statute.”).
291. See Froyd, supra note 174, at 1498–1500 (cataloging the flaws of the
safety valve provision).
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because of the distinctively large number of drugs they are
captured with.292
B.

Change the Penalty Provision

Defendants charged with drug crimes receive unduly harsh
mandatory minimum sentences.293 Though criticism of this
punitive sentencing regime is widespread,294 victims of the
MDLEA sentencing regime are recurrently forgotten.295 But
after years of political resistance to reform,296 the First Step Act
serves as some display of building potential energy for change.297
Congress initially created the safety valve provision to reduce

292. See infra Part V.
293. See United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“[M]andatory minimum sentences in drug cases distort the sentencing process
and mandate unjust sentences. . . . [T]oo many nonviolent, low-level,
substance-abusing defendants like Jamel Dossie ‘lose their claim to a
future’ . . . .”); Gonçlaves, Jr., supra note 47, at 19 (“Low-level drug couriers as
a whole are more likely to face imprisonment compared to those higher in the
drug pyramid. . . . [T]hey face mandatory punishments that vastly exceed
their culpability.” (footnote omitted)); Paul Cassell, Too Severe: A Defense of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory
Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1045 (2004) (“[I]t is striking how many of
these ‘horror stories’ stem from mandatory minimums in general and from
narcotics mandatory minimums in particular.”); Marc Mauer, The Impact of
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in Federal Sentencing, 94 JUDICATURE 6, 8
(2010), https://perma.cc/3VL4-9F9G (PDF) (“First, and most critical, is the fact
that mandatory penalties in the federal system have most often been applied
to the prosecution of drug offenses.”).
294. See Mauer, supra note 293, at 40 (“In regard to mandatory sentencing,
there is a broad consensus among legal organizations, scholars, and many
practitioners that such policies are counterproductive to a fair and effective
system of justice.”); see also Sandeep Dhaliwal, How Mandatory Minimums
Are Weaponized, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/SCX5-3ZYK
(“Though the First Step Act brought an increment of progress, most mandatory
minimums remain on the books, despite consistent criticism that these
penalties have contributed to over-incarceration.”).
295. This is likely because Congress focuses on those charged under the
federal importation statute. 21 U.S.C. § 952.
296. See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice
System, 128 YALE L.J. F. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/5FH7-RY7R (“The
federal justice system is unique in both its punitiveness and its resistance to
political reform.”).
297. See id. (“Three years ago, those of us in the criminal justice reform
community would have been shocked to hear about a bill like the First Step
Act passing.”).
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severe sentencing that the federal mandatory minimums
imposed on low-level offenders.298 The First Step Act illustrates
that, in contradiction with Eleventh and Ninth Circuit
precedent, this intent extends to noncitizens arrested under the
MDLEA.299 However, beyond the safety valve’s inherent flaws,
MDLEA defendants are uniquely incapable of experiencing its
reprieve because their sentences are so extreme.300
1.

Amend the Statute

The MDLEA’s sentencing scheme is derived from the
Controlled Substances Penalties.301 When Congress linked drug
quantities to culpability, it did so without any serious
substantiating evidence.302 According to the United States
Sentencing Commission, “[t]aken as a whole, the abbreviated,
somewhat murky legislative history simply does not provide a
single, consistently cited rationale” for the penalty structure.”303
Even worse, incorporating this penalty within the MDLEA
reads like an afterthought. The House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Crime relied on the insights of DEA agents and prosecutors
to create the drug quantities.304 This data could not have
included drug seizures on the high seas because, at this point,
drug trafficking on the high seas had been decriminalized for
298. See DOYLE, SAFETY VALVE AND SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note
173, at 2 (explaining the background of the safety valve provision); H.R. REP.
NO. 103-460, at 4 (1994) (“Ironically, however, for the very offenders who most
warrant proportionally lower sentences . . . mandatory minimums generally
operate to block the sentence from reflecting mitigating factors.”); United
States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 88 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A] first-time
offender with a relatively small role . . . might find himself sentenced to a
five- or ten-year prison term even though his advisory Guideline range
suggests a significantly lower sentence . . . . In 1994, Congress addressed this
‘irony.’”).
299. See DOYLE, SAFETY VALVE AND SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note
173, at 1 (“The First Step Act authorized safety-valve relief for convictions
under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act and for defendants with
slightly more extensive prior criminal records.”).
300. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
301. See supra Part I.C.1.
302. See supra Part I.A.
303. This source discusses the crack-cocaine ratio explicitly, but this is the
same punitive penalty structure applied to MDLEA defendants. Report on
Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, supra note 88.
304. Id.

1652

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1613 (2021)

sixteen years.305 Unfortunately, drug cartels utilize fishermen
because larger volumes of narcotics can be transported via
boat.306 Recent data depicts this reality.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2018, United States Customs and
Border Protection seized 58,160 pounds of cocaine and had 3,395
drug seizure events—resulting in an average of seven kilograms
(or seventeen pounds) of cocaine confiscated per seizure.307 By
comparison, the Coast Guard confiscated 416,000 pounds of
cocaine in FY 2018.308 While the Coast Guard seized
significantly more in drug weight, they had significantly fewer
seizures, averaging a greater volume of drugs per seizure.309
Congress compiled the intelligence of the DEA and
prosecutors to create a drug quantity that indicated whether or
not a defendant was a major trafficker.310 The MDLEA exposes
why that is bad logic. These fishermen-turned-smugglers are
not sophisticated criminals.311 They are fathers and husbands
trying to make money to support their families or avoid the

305. See supra Part I.A.
306. See Joshua Rapp Learn, The Number of Small Fishing Vessels
Smuggling Illegal Drugs Has Tripled, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://perma.cc/WT5L-GHD3
[T]he use of small fishing vessels to smuggle illegal drugs is on the
rise across the world as traffickers seek to take advantage of porous
borders . . . . The use of small vessels has tripled in the past eight
years to represent about 15 percent of the total global retail value
of illegal drugs.
307. See Drug Seizure Statistics, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (last
modified Aug. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/UCY9-37H3 (providing an
interactive chart).
308. See Christopher Woody, The Coast Guard Seized 208 Tons of Cocaine
Last Year and Started This Year with Another Narco Sub Bust, INSIDER (Nov
21, 2019, 9:23 AM), https://perma.cc/XHJ7-KA53 (“During the 2018 fiscal year,
Coast Guard personnel removed . . . just under 208 metric tons of cocaine
worth an estimated $6.14 billion . . . .”).
309. This is assumed because of rough calculation. For example, in FY
2018 the Coast Guard advertised that one mission “contributed to the removal
of 27,073 kilos of cocaine valued at nearly $900 million and the arrest or
detention of 63 suspected traffickers.” USCG, U.S. COAST GUARD ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 43 (2019), https://perma.cc/L4J3R9JM (PDF).
310. Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, supra note 88.
311. Weber, supra note 159, at 1767–68 (detailing the realities of being a
low-level drug courier); see Guy Lawson, How the Cartels Work, ROLLING
STONE (Apr. 18, 2011, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc/8FEN-F59A.
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wrath of the cartel.312 However, they are interdicted with
hundreds, sometimes thousands, of kilograms of cocaine.313
Because of their low status within the organization and the
likelihood of their capture, they are often intentionally
uninformed of the organization’s inner workings to safeguard
the drug supplier.314 Unlike those who attempt to smuggle drugs
via methods that trigger the Controlled Substances Act, the
volume of drugs seized per defendant under the MDLEA is
notably greater.315 For instance, a woman who smuggled 0.6
kilograms of cocaine within her luggage was sentenced
according to § 960.316 The judge in her case was able to show
leniency.317 By the nature of her crime, it would be absurd if she
had tried to smuggle much more in suitcases.318 In the same
way, it would be absurd if the cartel sent fishermen with
nominal amounts of narcotics.319 Their boats merely have a

312. Lerman, supra note 159, at 702–03 (“The temptation of short-term
financial relief comes at the cost of the extraordinary risk of many years of
imprisonment and death by cartel violence.”)
313. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (providing examples of the
drug quantities these defendants are normally arrested with).
314. See Young, supra note 158, at 64 (“For self-protection, drug suppliers
and distributors intentionally hire individuals who have no ongoing connection
with the supplier or distributor.”).
315. See supra notes 307–309 and accompanying text (listing the
statistical difference between Customs and Coast Guard drug seizures).
316. See United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y.
2016) (“Chevelle Nesbeth was convicted by a jury of importation of cocaine
with intent to distribute. Her advisory guidelines sentencing range was 33–41
months.”); see also Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Judge’s Striking Move in Felony
Drug Case: Probation, Not Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016),
https://perma.cc/QT3K-PNN5 (reporting on the humane sentence the female
drug courier received).
317. See Weiser, supra note 316 (“Judge Block sentenced Ms. Nesbeth to
one year of probation, to include six months of home confinement and 100
hours of community service . . . .”).
318. See Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (“While visiting Jamaica at the
behest of a boyfriend, she was given two suitcases by friends, who had
purchased her return airline ticket, and was asked to bring them to an
individual upon her arrival to the United States.”).
319. See, e.g., Kieran Corcoran, Drug Cartels Using New ‘Go-Fast’ Boats
that Are Almost INVISIBLE to Radar on Central American Smuggling
Missions, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 16, 2015, 3:17 PM), https://perma.cc/ZA3L-4N2D
(last updated Jan. 19, 2015) (“The criminals have replaced older, slow boats
with sleek Picuda models that are long, thin and can confound detection
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greater capacity.320 But when that capacity is one thousand
times the amount of cocaine the female courier transported, that
same judge would be hard-pressed to validate a low sentence
when the statutory requirement is ten years, and the Guidelines
suggest more.321 Even though neither defendant qualifies as the
major trafficker Congress thought it would imprison by setting
drug quantities, no place in our law considers the factual reality
of an MDLEA defendant.322 Certainly, there are domestic
couriers seized with large volumes of narcotics who would face
similar harsh sentencing.323 The difference is that MDLEA
defendants always face this harsh sentencing because of the
nature of the crime.324
Congress should incorporate a multiplier to § 960 to
increase the drug quantity requiring a mandatory minimum
sentence. For example, instead of five kilograms, a multiplier
could increase the quantity to five hundred or more kilograms.
This way the drug quantity reflects the MDLEA’s reality.
Determining this number would require further empirical
analysis and closer scrutiny than Congress previously relied
upon.325 Changing the statutory scheme would result in a
Guidelines change.326 Presumably, the offense level equal to the
methods . . . . Picudas can go as much as twice as fast as traditional smuggling
vessels while carrying around a [sic] one ton of illegal drugs each.”).
320. Id.
321. Compare Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 180 (including the guidelines
sentence of 33–41 months), with United States v. Trinidad, 839 F.3d 112, 114
(1st Cir. 2016) (including the guidelines sentence of 135 months of
imprisonment).
322. See H.R. REP. NO. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, at 16–17 (1986)
(defining major traffickers as “the manufacturers or the heads of organizations
who are responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities”).
323. See, e.g., Stella Chan & Amanda Jackson, DEA Announces Biggest
Domestic Seizure of Meth in Agency History, CNN, https://perma.cc/2LFRMFBB (last updated Oct. 14, 2020) (“Drug Enforcement Administration agents
seized more than 2,200 pounds of methamphetamine earlier this month, the
largest haul in the agency’s history domestically, according to officials.”).
324. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part I.A.
326. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. background (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (“Where necessary, this scheme has been modified in
response to specific congressional directives to the Commission.”); see also U.S
SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 22 (2018),
https://perma.cc/26GE-Q7VZ (PDF) (“Congress envisioned that the
Commission would regularly amend the guidelines to reflect various changes
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mandatory minimum sentence would include the matching drug
weight.327 However, the Commission sets base offense levels for
drug quantities above and below the mandatory minimum.328
These numbers were “extrapolated upward and downward to set
guideline sentencing ranges for all drug quantities.”329
Increasing the quantity within the statute would cause the
Guidelines quantity to increase, as well as all other drug ranges
above and below the mandatory minimum sentence.330 The
Guidelines change would help ameliorate harsh sentences
imposed by judges who closely follow the Guidelines.
2.

Judicial Impact

Striking differences in sentence length between domestic
drug couriers and the MDLEA defendants demonstrate current
judicial perception. In FY 2019, the average sentence length for
powder cocaine trafficking offenses was seventy months.331 Of
the 3,581 individuals sentenced, only 20.8 percent received
sentences ten years or greater.332 Though there is no calculated
average sentence for the MDLEA, judges consistently exceed the
statutory requirement.333 The mandatory minimum may be 120
in circumstances.”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) (“The
statutes and the Guidelines themselves foresee continuous evolution helped
by the sentencing courts and courts of appeals in that process.”).
327. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
328. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 amend. 782.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: POWDER COCAINE TRAFFICKING
OFFENSES 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/J95Q-5XEK (PDF).
332. Id.
333. See, e.g., United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir.
2016) (stating that the court sentenced one defendant to 120 months of
imprisonment and another to 135 months); United States v. Trinidad, 839 F.3d
112, 114 (1st Cir. 2016) (setting the defendant’s offense level to 33, resulting
in a minimum of 135 months of imprisonment); United States v. Peña-Santo,
809 F.3d 686, 691–92 (1st Cir. 2015) (“The district court sentenced Peña-Santo
to 120 months in prison, Vicente-Arias to 130 months, Gil-Martínez to 192
months, and Liriano to 240 months.”). United States v. Castillo-Romero, No.
8:09-cr-571-T-60MAP, 2020 WL 6203531, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2020)
(stating the court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of 168
months); United States v. Cuero Cuero, No. 8:18-cr-213-T-60AAS, 2020 WL
6203532, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2020) (stating that the court sentenced the
defendant to a term of imprisonment of 135 months).
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months, or ten years, but sentences upwards of 180 months, or
over fifteen years, are not rare.334
This is unsurprising considering the relevant statute and
the Guidelines. Rationalizing culpability with drug quantity is
an easy argument to make. For example, an MDLEA defendant
moved for compassionate release in response to the COVID-19
pandemic.335 The judge denied it, reasoning, “Defendant cannot
satisfy his burden of demonstrating that he is not a danger to
the community—he was sentenced as part of a venture aimed at
transporting 920 kilograms of cocaine to the United States, an
enormous quantity of narcotics.”336 In one sentence, the court
inferred that an enormous quantity of narcotics is tantamount
to being a danger to the community.337
What is surprising is the use of factors that suggest leniency
used against the MDLEA defendants. In the same case, the
judge continued:
When the United States Coast Guard intercepted the vessel,
he and his co-conspirators jettisoned the cocaine and
attempted to flee. As motives for agreeing to participate in the
venture, Defendant cited financial need and his family’s
healthcare concerns—motivations that would likely remain
upon his release.338

Another case, in line with this rhetoric, characterized a
fifty-nine-year old defendant’s desire to return home to
Columbia as seeking “to be returned to the area where he was
first recruited to engage in the criminal conduct.”339 When a
judge faces a defendant charged with the intention to distribute
334. See, e.g., United States v. Mosquera, No. 8:14-cr-379-T-36TGW, 2020
WL 7861372, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2020) (stating a jury sentenced the
defendant to a term of imprisonment of 235 months); Varela v. United States,
8:14-cr-379-T-36TGW, 2020 WL 4339353, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2020) (term
of imprisonment of 235 months); United States v. Suarez, No. 16-cr-453, 2020
WL 7646888, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2020) (term of imprisonment of 292
months); United States v. Rodriguez-Begerano, No. 8:12-cr-558-T-33AEP,
2020 WL 3000737, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2020) (term of imprisonment of 235
months).
335. United States v. Salazar, No. 8:18-cr-160-TPB-SPF, 2021 WL 390702
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2021).
336. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
337. Id.
338. Id. (emphasis added).
339. Id. at *5.
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a large quantity of drugs and an extreme sentence, classifying
that individual as a “danger to society” is simple. With an
amended quantity and adjusted Guidelines, a judicial approach
could accommodate the idea that even hundreds of kilograms of
cocaine fail to prove that these fishermen are the true threat to
the wellness of the United States.
CONCLUSION
The fisherman’s wife joins a local organization of over two
hundred women whose loved ones are incarcerated in the
United States.340 With their husbands gone and children to care
for, these women struggle to survive.341 The fisherman ages in
federal prison, worlds away from his family. Meanwhile, the
cartel flourishes. The drugs confiscated in the fisherman’s
capture are the cost of doing business. The cost of the
fisherman’s life is not a part of the cartel’s calculus, nor is it
seriously considered by the United States.
The United States is the “world’s largest per capita
consumer of illicit drugs, yet we punish others for satisfying our
appetite.”342 Under the MDLEA, fishermen from South and
Central America are treated like they’re solely responsible for
the so-called drug crisis in America.343 These men become
collateral damage to a war the United States fails to wage
against the heads of the cartels. Congress’s attempt to extend
safety valve reprieve via the First Step Act of 2018 was a
halfhearted attempt at justice.344 In order to actualize that
intent, Congress must reevaluate the absurdity of assigning
drug weight to culpability and acknowledge the reality of
MDLEA defendants.345 The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act’s sentencing regime must be changed.

340. Castillo, supra note 1 (explaining the Organization de Mujeres de
Pescadores en el Extranjero has over two hundred members).
341. Id.
342. Castillo, supra note 1.
343. See supra INTRODUCTION.
344. See supra Part III.A–B.
345. See supra Part IV.

